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The New World of Mobile
Communication: Redefining the Scope
of Warrantless Cell Phone Searches
Incident to Arrest
ABSTRACT
In many jurisdictions, law enforcement officials may conduct a
warrantless earch of the contents of an arrestee's cell phone incident to
an arrest. The judicial precedent for this policy dates back to the early
1990s when courts equated early mobile technology, such as pagers and
first generation cell phones, to physical containers capable of storing a
limited number of calls or messages. Supreme Court precedent had
long permitted the warrantless search of such containers incident to
arrest. However, due to advancements in technology, mobile devices,
such as smart phones, now have the capacity to hold a larger amount
of personal information, including text messages, diaries, pictures,
videos, financial information, and medical records. Because this
information may increase an arrestee's expectation of privacy in the
contents of a cell phone, an analogy to a finite physical container may
no longer be appropriate. In recognition of this change, two courts now
require law enforcement officials to have a warrant to search the
contents of an arrestee's cell phone incident to arrest.
This Note surveys how courts have dealt with changing mobile
technology in the context of a search incident to arrest and analyzes the
jurisdictional split. It also addresses the expectations of privacy in
today's mobile technology and suggests that courts use a function-based
approach when determining what information stored in a mobile
device may be viewed without a warrant and what information
necessarily requires a warrant.
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Three hundred and twenty-two million: the number of wireless
phone subscriptions in the United States-more than one per person.'
One hundred and eighty-seven billion: the number of minutes each
month that people in the United States spend talking on their wireless
phones.2 One hundred and ninety-six billion: the average number of
text messages those individuals send every month,3 equating to a
monthly total of over 638 text messages per person.
As these statistics indicate, a mobile revolution is well
underway in the United States. As our habits of communication
evolve, so must the legal system adapt to account for these changes.
With more than thirteen-and-a-half million people arrested annually
in the United States,4 it is more likely than ever that these individuals
have a cell phone on their person or in their immediate area at the
time of arrest. Currently, in all but a few jurisdictions, the arresting
officer can search the entire contents of the arrestee's phone without a
warrant.5 This search could include photos, videos, Internet history,
medical records, financial information, emails, mobile software
applications (apps), and any other content stored on the phone.
Under the "search incident to arrest doctrine"-one of the US
Supreme Court's exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement-an arresting officer has the right to search the arrestee
1. See U.S. Wireless Quich Facts, CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/advocacy/researchIindex.
cfmiaid/10323 (last visited Oct. 9, 2012).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Table 29: Estimated Number ofArrests, FBI, http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/
table_29.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2012) (displaying arrest statistics for the United States in
2009).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding a
search of a cell phone's contents permissible because the search was incident to a lawful arrest).
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and his immediate area without probable cause or a warrant, so long
as the search is contemporaneous with the arrest.6 The "container
doctrine" limits the scope of this search to any container on the
arrestee and the contents therein.7
Lower courts dispute whether to apply the container doctrine
to cell phones seized from an arrestee. Courts categorized early cell
phones as containers, finding that law enforcement officials could
search information stored therein without limitations. But
sophisticated "smart phones" can store massive amounts of data,
function like computers, and interact seamlessly with remote data
servers.8 The result of this technology is that individuals are capable
of carrying vastly greater quantities of personal information on their
person than ever before. As the quantity of personal information at
our fingertips increases, an individual's expectation of privacy in that
information likewise increases. A warrantless search of a smart
phone is therefore much more intrusive than that of an early cell
phone.
Only recently have courts begun to consider whether the
changes in mobile technology should have an impact on the
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine. In most cases, courts have not
considered the implications of a warrantless search of a cell phone
that has virtually unlimited storage capacity; however, recent
opinions indicate an increased concern for individuals' expectations of
privacy in their phone's contents.9 In two significant opinions, State v.
Smith and Schlossberg v. Solesbee, the Ohio Supreme Court and the
US District Court for the District of Oregon, respectively, prohibited
the search of cell phones incident to arrest.10 These recent decisions
demonstrate a divergence among courts. Many courts, in accordance
with the weight of precedent, continue to apply the container doctrine
and permit unlimited searches of cell phones incident to arrest.
Nevertheless, some courts are beginning to consider the enhanced
6. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973).
7. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763-64 (1979); United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
8. See Liane Cassavoy, What Makes a Smartphone Smart?, ABOUT.COM, http://cell
phones.about.com/od/smartphonebasics/a/whatissmart.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (N.D.
Cal. May 23, 2007) ("[Modern cellular phones have the capacity for storing immense amounts of
private information. Unlike pagers or address books, modern cell phones record incoming and
outgoing calls, and can also contain address books, calendars, voice and text messages, email,
video and pictures.").
10. Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Or. 2012); State v. Smith,
920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009).
3772013]
VANDERBILT J OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW
capacities of mobile phones and thus proscribe such searches to
protect individuals' privacy."
This Note addresses the concerns that arise when applying the
container doctrine to modern cell phones. Part I of the Note explains
the history and rationale of the container doctrine and explores its
application to technological devices such as pagers, cell phones,
cameras, and computers. Part II analyzes the lower courts' attempts
to rationalize the privacy implications of mobile devices with the US
Supreme Court's container doctrine and the need to maintain
bright-line rules in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Finally, Part
III discusses solutions proposed by courts and commentators, and
suggests a function-based rule for applying the
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine to cell phones and other similar
wireless devices.
I. ADJUDICATING THE CONTAINER DOCTRINE AND MOBILE
TECHNOLOGY
The language of the Fourth Amendment provides the rationale
for the search-incident-to-arrest exception.12 The container doctrine
delineates the scope of this exception.13 However, both the exception
and the subsequent refinement were established prior to the advent of
mobile technology.14 This section first explores how courts have
traditionally applied the container doctrine. Next, it examines the
extent to which courts have adapted the doctrine to account for mobile
technology.
A. The Development and Scope of the Container Doctrine
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the "right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures."'5 A reasonable search generally
requires the issuance of a warrant based on probable cause.16 But
11. Compare Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (finding that a cell phone has heightened
privacy concerns that caution against a warrantless search), with United States v. Hill, No. CR
10-00261 JSW, 2011 WL 90130, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011) (finding that a cell phone should
not be treated differently than any other container).
12. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
13. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
14. Robinson and Chimel were decided in 1973 and 1969, respectively. Id.; Chimel, 395
U.S. 752. Both cases predate the first commercial cell phones by at least eleven years. See First
Cell Phone a True 'Brick', MSNBC NEWS (Apr. 11, 2005, 6:55 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
7432915/ns/technology-and-science-wireless/t/first-cell-phone-true-brick.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967).
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courts have determined that some warrantless searches are
reasonable in a limited number of circumstances. Among these
circumstances are searches and seizures occurring when there are
exigent circumstances and during a lawful arrest by a law
enforcement official. 17
The search-incident-to-arrest exception took its modern form in
Chimel v. California.18 The US Supreme Court based the doctrine on
two rationales-officer safety and evidence preservation.' It held
that it is reasonable for an officer to search an arrestee for weapons
that may be used in resistance or escape and to prevent concealment
or destruction of evidence.20 The scope of the exception is spatially
limited to "the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to
grab a weapon or evidentiary items."21 It is also temporally limited, as
the officers must conduct the search contemporaneously with the
arrest.22
The two rationales justify the rule itself, but they are not
threshold requirements that law enforcement officers must satisfy
before searching an arrestee.23 In other words, law enforcement
officials do not need to prove that there was a threat to officer safety
or a need to preserve evidence at the time of the search in order to
ensure that the search was lawful. As long as a search takes place
contemporaneous to the arrest, it is valid.24 Likewise, a court need not
rely on these rationales to admit evidence obtained in a search
incident to arrest. Thus, the rationales do not serve as an evidentiary
standard, but rather as "an adequate basis for treating all custodial
17. See Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 34 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 37, 37
(2005).
18. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
19. See id. at 762-63.
20. See id. at 763.
21. See id. Though the precise boundary of the "area" within which a search incident to
arrest is lawful is often litigated, for the purposes of this Note, the analysis proceeds using the
assumption that cell phones are on the person or within an area that the courts find permissible,
such as in the passenger compartment of an automobile. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454, 460 (1981) (holding that a police officer may lawfully search the passenger compartment of a
vehicle contemporaneous with the arrest when the arrestee was an occupant of that vehicle).
22. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 764.
23. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (explaining that because
the rationale of search-incident-to-arrest cases "speak[s] not simply in terms of an exception to
the warrant requirement, but in terms of an affirmative authority to search, they clearly imply
that such searches also meet the Fourth Amendment's requirement of reasonableness"). The
Court also notes the "traditional and unqualified authority of the arresting officer to search the
arrestee's person." Id. at 229.
24. See id. at 235 ("[W]e hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of
the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is
also a 'reasonable' search under that Amendment.").
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arrests alike for purposes of search justification."25 As such, the
search-incident-to-arrest exception exemplifies the Court's preference
for bright-line rules in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.2 6
The container doctrine, enunciated in United States v.
Robinson, further defines the permissible scope of a search incident to
arrest.27 In addition to the spatial and temporal limitations of Chimel,
the container doctrine dictates that the lawful scope of a search
incident to arrest may include the search of any container, and the
contents therein, found on the arrestee or in his immediate area.28 In
Robinson, a District of Columbia law enforcement officer stopped and
subsequently arrested the defendant on suspicion of driving with a
suspended operator's permit.29 Upon a warrantless search of the
defendant, the officer found a crumpled up cigarette pack in the chest
pocket of the defendant's shirt that contained fourteen capsules of
heroin.30 The defendant challenged the validity of the search, arguing
that, by looking within the closed cigarette pack, the officer violated
the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.31 The Court disagreed,
stating: "Having in the course of a lawful search come upon the
crumpled package of cigarettes, [the officer] was entitled to inspect it;
and when his inspection revealed the heroin capsules, he was entitled
to seize them as 'fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband' probative of
criminal conduct."32  Through Robinson, the court crafted the
container doctrine by extending the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine
to the contents of containers found on the arrestee.33
The Court readdressed the container doctrine eight years later
in New York v. Belton, noting that although the arrestee may have a
privacy interest in the container, it is "the lawful custodial arrest
[that] justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee
may have."3 4 Thus, during an arrest, law enforcement officials can
25. See id.
26. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 ("[A] single, familiar standard is essential to guide police
officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and
individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront." (quoting Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979))).
27. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236.
28. See id.
29. Id. at 220-21.
30. Id. at 221-23.
31. The defendant argued that at the time the officer obtained the cigarette pack, there
was no danger of the defendant either destroying the evidence or acquiring a weapon from it to
resist the arrest; thus, the officer was required under the Fourth Amendment to obtain a search
warrant. Id. at 219-20. For an analysis supporting defendant's position, see id. at 238-59
(Marshall, J., dissenting opinion).
32. Id. at 236 (majority opinion).
33. Id.
34. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 (1981).
380 [Vol. 15:2:375
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search the arrestee and the contents of any container found on the
arrestee's person without probable cause, a warrant, or any additional
justification.35 Examples of lawfully searchable containers include
purses,36 wallets,37 briefcases,38 locked bags,39 and address books.40
B. The Container Doctrine Meets Technology: Pagers, Cameras, and
Cell Phones
As mobile technology reached consumer markets, courts faced
the threshold question of determining whether these new devices were
"containers" under the traditional container doctrine. The first of
these devices was the pager. Without exception, courts found that the
information contained on a pager was within the scope of a search
incident to arrest.4 1 In most cases, courts analogized the pager and
the messages contained therein to a closed container and its
contents.42 In United States v. Chan, for example, the US Court of
35. However, the Supreme Court has narrowed this rule for containers found in the
arrestee's immediate area, finding that one of the two justifications must be present for the
warrantless search incident to arrest of such a container, but there is still no requirement to
justify a search of containers found on the arrestee's person. See United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 14 (1977), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991). Some courts have
classified phones as items in the arrestee's immediate area, thereby restricting searchability
after the phone is seized and there is no longer a threat of the arrestee destroying it as evidence.
See, e.g., United States v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR, 2008 WL 5381412, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22,
2008).
36. See, e.g., Curd v. City Court of Judsonia, Ark., 141 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Garcia, 605 F.2d 349
(7th Cir. 1979).
37. See, e.g., United States v. McCroy, 102 F.3d 239 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Molinaro, 877 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Castro, 596 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1979);
Evans v. Solomon, 681 F. Supp. 2d 233 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Ivy, 973 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Johnson, 846 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1988).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Silva, 745 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1984).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Holzman, 871 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1989).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Charles, 138 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Hunter, No. 96-4259, 1998 WL 887289 (4th Cir. Oct. 29, 1998); United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d
977 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v.
Lynch, 908 F. Supp. 284 (D.V.I. 1995); United States v. Galante, No. 94 Cr. 633 (LMM), 1995 WL
507249 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1995); United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
42. See, e.g., Reyes, 922 F. Supp. at 833; Lynch, 908 F. Supp. at 288 ("Just as police can
lawfully search the contents of an arrestee's wallet or address book incident to an arrest, we hold
that the agents here could lawfully search the contents of Thomas' pager incident to his arrest.");
Chan, 830 F. Supp. at 536; see also, e.g., Ortiz, 84 F.3d at 977. But some courts justified the
search of a pager's contents on exigent circumstances because information could be lost or
destroyed if the pager was turned off or if incoming pages filled the memory of the device. See,
e.g., Hunter, 1998 WL 887289 at *3 ("It is, therefore, imperative that law enforcement officers
have the authority to immediately 'search' or retrieve, incident to a valid arrest, information
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Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explained that "an electronic repository
for personal data is . .. analogous to that in a personal address book or
other repository for such information."43 Accordingly, in a search
incident to arrest, a law enforcement officer can search a pager
irrespective of any expectations of privacy.44
As cell phones replaced pagers on the belt clip, courts largely
placed the new technology, like pagers, squarely within the container
doctrine.45 In United States v. Wurie, for example, the defendant
sought to suppress evidence of his cell phone's call log, which police
had obtained during a search of his phone incident to arrest.46
Surveying the jurisprudential landscape, the court found that
decisions "trend heavily in favor" of validating cell phone searches in a
search incident to arrest.47 Noting that courts often analogize cell
phones to pagers, the court concluded that there is "no principled basis
for distinguishing a warrantless search of a cell phone from a
warrantless search of other types of personal containers found on a
defendant's person."48 This court, like many others, thereby applied
the traditional rules of the container doctrine to cell phones.49
Although initially few courts espoused Fourth Amendment
concerns regarding the search of cell phones, recent cases show
enhanced caution toward broadening the coitainer doctrine to account
for cell phones. Some courts have found that while seizing a cell
phone is lawful in a search incident to arrest, searching the phone's
memory is a separate question.50 But these courts ultimately found
that searching the phone's memory is lawful under an exigency
exception since subsequent incoming calls could result in the deletion
of the call logs.5 1 Nevertheless, these decisions show that some courts
from a pager in order to prevent its destruction as evidence."). See infra Part II.C for an extended
discussion on exigent circumstances rationale.
43. Chan, 830 F. Supp. at 534.
44. Id. at 535 (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding that
a search incident to arrest of defendant's cell phone call logs and text messages was lawful
because the permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest extends to containers found
on the arrestee's person) (citation omitted); United States v. Valdez, No. 06-CR-336, 2008 WL
360548, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 8, 2008); United States v. Dennis, No. 07-CR-008-DLB, 2007 WL
3400500, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 13, 2007); United States v. Mercado-Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1271,
1277 (D. Kan. 2007).
46. United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104, 105-07 (D. Mass. 2009).
47. Id. at 109.
48. Id. at 110.
49. Id.
50. See United States v. Parada, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1303 (D. Kan. 2003); see also
United States v. Lottie, No. 3:07cr5lRM, 2008 WL 150046, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 14, 2008).
51. See Parada, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 1303-04; Lottie, 2008 WL 150046, at *3.
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are hesitant to expose the contents of a cell phone's memory in a
search incident to arrest.
The judiciary's growing caution to permit the search of a cell
phone's contents may be related to the rapid changes in mobile
technology. In United States v. Park, the US District Court for the
Northern District of California addressed the information capacity of
modern cell phones (i.e., smart phones) and made clear its reluctance
to permit warrantless searches of the content of these phones.52 In
Park, police searched the arrestee's cell phone in the police station
during the booking process.53 The court expressed a concern for an
arrestee's privacy because "the line between cell phones and personal
computers has grown increasingly blurry."54 The court explained
further:
[T]he information contained in a laptop and in electronic storage devices renders a
search of their contents substantially more intrusive than a search of the contents of a
lunchbox or other tangible object.... People keep all types of personal information on
computers, including diaries, personal letters, medical information, photos[,] and
financial records.
55
Despite its concerns, the court did not distinguish cell phones from
containers; rather, in suppressing the evidence gathered from the
phone, the court ultimately based its decision on the timing of the
search.56 The decision reflects the court's discomfort with a rule that
permits an unrestrained search of a modern cell phone incident to
arrest.57
Drawing on the reasoning from Park, two courts have diverged
from precedent and prohibited law enforcement officials from
searching the contents of cell phones incident to arrest.58 Both courts
held that cell phones are not containers and are therefore outside the
scope of Robinson and its progeny.59 In State v. Smith, the Ohio
Supreme Court observed that cell phones of the modern age bear little
52. United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *5-9 (N.D. Cal. May
23, 2007). But see United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
53. Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *3.
54. Id. at *8.
55. Id. (quoting United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1004 (C.D. Cal. 2006)).
56. See id. In excluding the evidence, the court found that the search of the cell phone
during the booking process was not contemporaneous with the arrest, and therefore did not fall
within the temporal scope of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine. Id.
57. See id.; Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1168 (D. Or. 2012) ("Although
the Park court's holding technically turned on the timing of the search . . . the decision makes
clear that the court's disagreement with Finley was more fundamental.").
58. Schlossberg, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1170-71; State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 950 (Ohio
2009).
59. Schlossberg, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1170; Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 949.
2013] 383
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resemblance to early cell phones and pagers.60 Modern cell phones
"defy easy categorization," for "their ability to store large amounts of
private data gives their users a reasonable and justifiable expectation
of a higher level of privacy in the information they contain."6 '
Although several federal courts previously had characterized cell
phones as containers, the court held that modern cell phones are not
containers, and officers must therefore obtain a warrant before
searching a phone's contents.62
Though some courts have shown a reluctance to adopt the
Smith rationale,63 one federal district court recently embraced the
Ohio Supreme Court's reasoning.64 In Schlossberg v. Solesbee, a case
involving the warrantless search of a digital camera,65 a law
enforcement officer seized a camera in a search incident to an arrest
for unlawful inception of communication.6 6 The officer reviewed the
footage immediately thereafter.67  In suppressing the evidence
attained from the camera, the court explained that cases likening
electronic devices, such as cell phones and digital cameras, to
containers have two primary faults.68 First, the court suggested that
the Ohio Supreme Court defined "container" as a physical object that
holds another physical object.69 As the capacity of an electronic device
is in no way relative to its size and as it cannot hold another physical
object,70 the Supreme Court's definition of container excludes personal
electronic devices.7' Second, the court reasoned that prior decisions
failed to consider the large amounts of information that modern cell
phones and personal electronic devices can hold.7 2 To classify them as
containers, and hence subject them to warrantless searches, would
essentially create the following new rule: "any citizen committing even
the most minor arrestable offense is at risk of having his or her most
60. Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 954.
61. Id. at 955.
62. Id. at 953-55.
63. See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 511 n.17 (Cal. 2011) ('The Ohio court's focus
on the extent of the arrestee's expectation of privacy is, as previously explained, inconsistent
with the high court's decisions."), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 (2011); see also Fawdry v. State, 70
So. 3d 626, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) ("We are unpersuaded by Smith.").
64. Schlossberg, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1169 (finding Smith's reasoning persuasive and that
cell phones are not containers).
65. Id. at 1170 ("Having found that personal electronic devices such as cameras and cell
phones cannot be considered closed containers, I must consider how they should be classified.").
66. Id. at 1166.
67. Id.
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intimate information viewed by an arresting officer." 73 This may
violate the public's objective expectation of privacy in the contents of a
cell phone, as originally espoused in Katz v. United States;74 thus, the
new rule is untenable and contravenes the Fourth Amendment. The
Court further found that it is impractical for officers to distinguish
between types of personal electronic devices, so the rule must prohibit
a search incident to arrest of any of these devices.75
Interestingly, as of the writing of this Note, no federal courts
and only one state court76 have addressed whether law enforcement
officials can search a personal computer incident to arrest.77 As
Professor Matthew Orso suggested:
The answer may be that even police do not believe a search of a computer incident to
arrest is permissible, seeking instead a warrant for the search of computers. One may
look to the plethora of case law discussing the search of computers pursuant to warrants
in support of this answer.
78
Nonetheless, courts have, on occasion, addressed the computer-like
features of a cell phone, distinguishing them from the phone's other
features. One federal court suggested that when a search was limited
to an address book and call log on a cell phone, the search was
permissible, "leav[ing] for another day the propriety of a broader
search equivalent to the search of a personal computer."79
As these cases indicate, courts have traditionally applied the
container doctrine to mobile devices.80 Recently, however, some courts
have hesitated to categorize computer-like mobile devices as
containers.8 1 The result is a divergence among courts regarding the
extent to which a law enforcement officer may search an arrestee's
mobile device incident to arrest.8 2
73. Id.
74. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining
that a government search requires a warrant under the Fourth Amendment if the individual has
an actual expectation of privacy and society is prepared to accept this expectation as reasonable).
75. Schlossberg, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1170.
76. State v. Washington, 110 Wash. App. 1012 (Ct. App. 2002).
77. Matthew E. Orso, Cellular Phones, Warrantless Searches, and the New Frontier of
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 183, 215 (2010).
78. Id.
79. United States v. Valdez, No. 06-CR-336, 2008 WL 360548, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 8,
2008).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104, 110 (D. Mass. 2009).
81. See, e.g., Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Or. 2012).
82. Compare id. (finding that mobile electronic devices are not containers and their
contents cannot be searched incident to arrest), with Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 110 (finding that
cell phones are containers and their contents may be searched in accordance with the container
doctrine).
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II. ISSUES CONFRONTING COURTS IN WARRANTLESS CELL PHONE
SEARCHES
The large number of warrantless cell phone search cases in the
past decade83 reflects both the explosion of mobile usage in the United
StateS84 and the ambiguity of the warrantless cell phone search
standard. A clear rule for the search of a cell phone incident to arrest
would not only be valuable guidance for law enforcement officials, but
would also serve as a privacy notice for cell phone owners.
The jurisprudence to date highlights four significant issues
courts face in analyzing cell phone searches. First, courts must
address a possible heightened expectation of privacy for information
on cell phones, analyzing both the quantitative and qualitative
capacities of modern phones. Second, courts must determine whether
a cellular device is a "container" under Robinson. The decision is
fundamentally about the appropriate scope of the doctrine itself-how,
if at all, does the doctrine address virtual and spatial parameters?
Third, courts must determine whether exigent circumstances exist to
justify the search of a cell phone. Finally, courts must maintain
bright-line rules not only to facilitate law enforcement officials in the
application of the rules, but also to avoid ambiguity with future
technologies of wireless devices.
A. The Expectation of Privacy in Cell Phone Content
Reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment requires
balancing the state's need to conduct a search and the individual's
right to privacy.85 But the Supreme Court determined that the
rationale for the rule always outweighs potential interests in privacy
expectations." The Court held that a search incident to arrest is a
"reasonable" search under the Fourth Amendment.87 Thus, "the
lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy
interest the arrestee may have."88
83. See Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Validity of Search of Wireless Communication
Devices, 62 A.L.R. 161 (6th ed. 2011) (identifying more than fifty cases involving a search incident
to arrest of a wireless communication device).
84. See U.S. Wireless Quick Facts, supra note 1 (finding that, at 321.7 million wireless
subscriber connections, there are more cell phones in the United States than people).
85. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) ('In each case it requires a balancing of
the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search
entails.").
86. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 (1981) (noting that a search incident to
arrest is lawful despite an arrestee's privacy interest in the contents of the container).
87. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
88. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 461.
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The Court's decision that a warrantless search within the scope
of the container doctrine is per se reasonable implies that the need to
protect officers and preserve evidence outweighs the arrestee's privacy
interest. When officers act beyond the scope of the
search-incident-to-arrest exception, the rationales behind the
exception are less applicable. As a result, the state's need to conduct a
warrantless search is likely less compelling when balanced against the
arrestee's expectation of privacy, and a search incident to arrest may
be unreasonable.89 For example, when an individual is arrested in his
home, which represents the zenith of privacy expectations, an officer
may search a desk drawer immediately in front of the arrestee for a
weapon or evidence, but not the other drawers in the room.90 As the
officer distances his search from the "immediate area" of the arrestee,
the state's need to locate a weapon or preserve evidence decreases;
however, the arrestee's high expectation of privacy in his home
remains the same. Similarly, when an officer does not conduct a
search contemporaneous with the arrest, the officer acts beyond the
temporal scope of the doctrine and the state's need to conduct the
search decreases.91 When the state's need to search decreases and the
individual's privacy interest remains high, a court is more likely to
find that the search was unreasonable and thus violates the Fourth
Amendment.
The converse is true as well: when an individual's expectation
of privacy increases, it may outweigh the state's need to conduct the
search. When the Supreme Court decided Robinson and Belton, an
arrestee's privacy expectations were limited to the physical objects
that he could carry on his person.92 At that time, no cell phones or
other personal electronic devices existed.93  Thus, the container
doctrine, which states that the search of a physical container and its
contents incident to arrest is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, was appropriate because of the physical limitations of
information storage. For example, in 1969, a lifetime of financial
records would likely be kept in paper form, contained within a large
filing cabinet that an individual could not carry. Now, however, those
same records can be stored and accessed on a cell phone and carried at
all times. If courts believe that a cell phone's capacity to store
89. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
90. See id.
91. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (finding that a search of a
footlocker incident to arrest is not lawful when the property seized is "not immediately
associated with the person" and is searched more than an hour after the arrest), abrogated by
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
92. See discussion supra Part I.A.
93. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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virtually unlimited information creates a higher expectation of
privacy, applying the bright-line rule of Robinson to wireless devices
may violate the Fourth Amendment.94
An individual's privacy interest may depend on what type of
information a law enforcement officer accesses on the phone. While
"the phone's address book and call history" do not implicate increased
privacy concerns, "listen[ing] to voice mails or read[ing] . . . text
messages" may implicate those same concerns.95 This reasoning is
indicative of a body of jurisprudence that associates various
expectations of privacy with different cell phone features.96 Generally
speaking, call logs have minimal privacy expectations,97 data storage
has significant privacy expectations,98 and text messages fall
somewhere in between.99
Under current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, there is no
heightened expectation of privacy in a cell phone's call log.100 Courts
principally rely on the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v.
Maryland, where the Court found that when a person dials a number
from a landline, he knowingly conveys that number to the telephone
company; thus, he forfeits any expectation of privacy in that
number.101  That reasoning seamlessly translates to cell phone
usage.102 Customers receive detailed bills about their phone usage
and call history, indicating that a third party maintains records of
their phone activity.103  Therefore, courts may reason that the
94. See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009).
95. United States v. Valdez, No. 06-CR-336, 2008 WL 360548, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 8,
2008).
96. See infra notes 100-117 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Beckwith v. Erie Cnty. Water Auth., 413 F. Supp. 2d 214, 223-24
(W.D.N.Y. 2006) ("[flhere is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers one
dials.").
98. Compare Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 955 ("[Cell phones] have the ability to transmit large
amounts of data in various forms, likening them to laptop computers, which are entitled to a
higher expectation of privacy."), with id. at 957 (Cupp, J., dissenting) (contesting the application
of standards for address books and computers to more complicated cellular phones).
99. See infra notes 105-06.
100. See, e.g., Beckwith, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 224 ("When Beckwith used his cellular
telephone to call the media, he voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone
company and 'exposed' that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business, and
therefore lost any reasonable expectation of privacy in the existence and identity of such calls."
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
101. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) ("All telephone users realize that
they must 'convey' phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone
company switching equipment that their calls are completed.").
102. See, e.g., Beckwith, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 224.
103. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 ("All subscribers realize, moreover, that the phone
company has facilities for making permanent records of the numbers they dial, for they see a list
of their long-distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills.").
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customer has forfeited his privacy interests in the cell phone call
logs. 104
Courts show more privacy concerns when analyzing text
messages, though decisions cut both ways. Some courts do not
identify higher expectations of privacy in the content of text
messages,105 even reasoning that courts should afford electronic
messages less privacy than call logS. 106  One rationale for this
approach is that when a text message is sent, the sender does not
know who possesses the phone; thus, the sender can have no
expectation of privacy in that message.107 On the other hand, some
courts afford text messages the highest expectation of privacy,
likening them to sealed letters.108 Such items constitute a "class of
effects in which the public at large has a legitimate expectation of
privacy," rendering a warrantless search presumptively
unreasonable.109
Courts are likely to find a substantial expectation of privacy in
digital information stored on a phone's memory. For example, in
Smith, the Ohio Supreme Court considered the large amounts of
personal data on "standard" cell phones.110  This functionality
"gives ... users a reasonable and justifiable expectation of a higher
level of privacy in the information they contain."11' Similarly, in
Schlossberg, the court found modern cell phones are able to hold large
amounts of private information, including "phonebook information,
appointment calendars, text messages, call logs, photographs, audio
and video recordings, web browsing history, electronic documents[,]
104. See, e.g., Beckwith, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 224.
105. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 278 F. App'x 242, 246 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding that
"officers permissibly accessed and copied . . . text messages" in a search incident to arrest);
United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that officers could search a
cell phone's call records and text messages incident to arrest).
106. See United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 959 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding no
expectation of privacy for electronic pager messages because when one sends an electronic
message, there is no way to know who is in possession of the device receiving the message, as
opposed to a telephone call where one can hear the recipient's voice prior to transmitting
information); see also United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1011 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding no
reasonable expectation of privacy in an audible message left on telephone answering machine).
107. See Meriwether, 917 F.2d at 959.
108. See United States v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR, 2008 WL 5381412, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec.
22, 2008) (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984)) ('The content of a text
message on a cell phone presents no danger of physical harm to the arresting officers or
others . .. [and] searching through information stored on a cell phone is analogous to a search of
a sealed letter, which requires a warrant.").
109. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 114.
110. See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954 (Ohio 2009). To be clear, the court analyzed
the data capacity of a cell phone that is less sophisticated than a smart phone. See id.
111. See id.
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and user location information."112 Because of this capacity, the court
held that these devices are entitled to "a higher standard of privacy,"
and therefore the Fourth Amendment protects them from warrantless
searches, even incident to a lawful arrest.113
It is logical that only a few courts have considered the privacy
expectations of information storage on cell phones, as a majority of
cases were decided before the advent of smart phones.114 Even in
instances involving more sophisticated cell phone technology, though
acknowledging the risks to individual privacy, federal district courts
would not turn against the weight of precedent without guidance from
higher courts."15 Other recent holdings involving smart phones are
limited to the suppression of call logs or text messages, rather than
other types of data storage.16 Nevertheless, the weight of judicial
authority affords a higher degree of privacy to the advanced storage
functions of cell phones and personal electronic devices--certainly
more so than that traditionally afforded to call logs and, arguably, text
messages." Despite judicial recognition of increased privacy rights in
certain cell phone functions, only a few courts have held that the
expectation of privacy is substantial enough to warrant Fourth
Amendment protection from a search incident to arrest.
B. Cell Phones as Traditional Containers under Robinson
An overbroad search, like a heightened expectation of privacy,
may render a search unreasonable, as the state's need for the broader
search is no longer reasonable relative to the privacy interests of the
112. Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Or. 2012).
113. Id.
114. The first models of the BlackBerry and iPhone, two of the first and most popular
multifunctional smart phones, were not even released until 2002 and 2007, respectively. See
Mathew Honan, Apple Unveils iPhone, MACWORLD (Jan. 9, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://www.
macworld.com/article/54769/2007/01/iphone.html; David Smith, The History of the BlackBerry
Smartphone, MOBIMADNESS (Aug. 2, 2009), http://www.mobimadness.com/the-history-of-the-
blackberry-smartphone.
115. See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1146 (S.D. Fla. 2011) ("Even
though we may disagree with the application of that post-Chimel line of cases to the
ever-advancing technology of cell phones . .. we are constrained to apply the law as the Supreme
Court currently pronounces it."); United States v. Hill, No. CR 10-00261 JSW, 2011 WL 90130, at
*7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011) (finding search incident to arrest of a cell phone's pictures lawful,
even though they may store "large amounts of personal information" because no guidance
otherwise from the Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court existed).
116. See, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 704 S.E.2d 866, 892 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that
though the case involved suppression of text messages, the phone had greater data storage
capabilities, and "[g]iven the volume and diverse nature of data that may be contained in a cell
phone or other mobile electronic data storage device," the search of these devices in other
instances should be limited).
117. See supra notes 100-108 and accompanying text.
390 [Vol. 15:2:375
THE NEW WORLD OF MOBILE COMMUNICATION
arrestee. To determine the reasonable breadth of a search incident to
arrest, the Supreme Court refined both the spatial and temporal
limitations of the doctrine.18 The Court also defined the scope of a
container as an "object capable of holding another [physical] object,"119
creating a bright-line rule for reasonable searches incident to arrest.
When officers restrict searches to those parameters, the need to
conduct a search always outweighs the arrestee's privacy interest.
But as Professor Matthew Orso has noted, cell phones and electronic
devices bring in an additional dimension-virtual scope.120 The issue
is whether cell phone contents properly fit within the traditional
parameters of the container doctrine, or whether the virtual scope of
the devices brings them outside the confines of the doctrine.
The container doctrine, as it stands today, is ill suited to
address the parameters of virtual scope. The capacities of cell phones
and similar electronic storage devices do not fit within the traditional
notions of physical scope. Containers, as physical objects, are
constrained by their proximity to the arrestee as well as by their
dimensions, which determine their ability to hold other physical
objects. This reflects the finite limitations to the physical scope of the
container doctrine; the doctrine implicates clearly demarcated
physical boundaries. Wireless and portable data-storage capabilities
differ from traditional containers because neither the proximity to an
arrestee nor the physical size of the container creates obvious physical
search limitations. Rather, modern wireless and data storage devices
serve as portals into a nearly infinite realm of information, essentially
unrestrained by the physical size of the container.
The term "infinite" is not hyperbole. The modern pattern of
transitioning data storage to a "cloud computing" model means that
unlimited amounts of data may be accessible on any given device, and
the storage capacity of the device does not limit its ability to access
data.121 Cloud computing involves centralized servers that maintain
enormous quantities of digital space for file and information storage,
which are then accessible from any device with Internet access,
118. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 341 (2009) (holding that a constitutionally
permissible search incident to arrest must be in the area reachable by arrestee at time of
search); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 2 (1977) (holding that a constitutionally
permissible incident to arrest search cannot be remote in time or place from the arrest),
abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763
(1969) (holding that a constitutionally permissible search incident to arrest must be within the
immediate area of arrestee).
119. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 (1981).
120. See Orso, supra note 77, at 206-08.
121. See Rivka Tadjer, What Is Cloud Computing?, PCMAG.COM (Nov. 18, 2010), http://
www.pcmag.comlarticle2/0,2817,2372163,00.asp.
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including cell phones.122 It is essentially a hub-and-spoke system for
data storage, and any cell phone user has access to the hub at all
times. As a result, the amount of information and the types of
information accessible from a cell phone are immeasurable.
With no guidance from the Supreme Court on the permissible
virtual scope of a search incident to arrest, courts have generally
taken a binary approach: they either entirely permit 23 or entirely
exclude24 evidence from cell phone data. Those permitting searches of
cell phone data analyze cell phones under the container doctrine,
analogizing information on the phone to the physical contents of a
container.125 But this is problematic because it does not create any
limitations on the virtual scope of a police officer's search.126 The very
purpose of the container doctrine is to create parameters within which
a law enforcement officer can conduct a per se reasonable search
incident to arrest.127 By analyzing searches of cell phone contents
under a doctrine with only physical and temporal constraints, an
infinite search of personal information becomes per se reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. 128
On the other hand, courts that do not categorize all cell phones
as containers may prohibit an officer from conducting a reasonable
and lawful search incident to arrest.129 The public may not have a
heightened expectation of privacy in certain types of information on a
cell phone, such as call logs, address books, calendars, and, arguably,
text messages.130 Thus, it is perhaps an unnecessary limitation on the
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine to find that cell phones as a class
are outside the scope of the doctrine. The real concern is that some of
122. See id.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2007) (extending
the container doctrine to cell phones and the information contained therein).
124. See, e.g., Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Or. 2012).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104, 110 (D. Mass. 2009) ("There is
no principled basis for distinguishing a warrantless search of a cell phone from the search of
other types of personal containers found on a defendant's person.").
126. See Schlossberg, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1170 ("It is inexplicable as well as inconsistent
with the privacy interest at the core of the Fourth Amendment that many courts now allow
officers to conduct warrantless searches of electronic devices capable of holding large volumes of
private information which may or may not have any relevance to the arrest offense.").
127. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977), abrogated by California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
128. See United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (N.D. Cal.
May 23, 2007).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Valdez, No. 06-CR-336, 2008 WL 360548, at *3 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 8, 2008) (finding "no authority for the proposition that a search incident to arrest must be
supported by any level of suspicion that the search will uncover evidence" when police officer did,
in fact, find evidence of the crime in arrestee's call log).
130. See supra Part II.A.
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the information on these devices is unrelated to the arrestee's crime 31
and implicates increased privacy concerns.132
The container doctrine in its current form insufficiently
protects individual privacy interests because, in some jurisdictions, it
fails to provide search limits to the virtual scope of cell phones. At the
same time, prohibiting the search of cell phones is an insufficient
solution because searches of certain information, such as call logs,
should be permissible under the search-incident-to- arrest doctrine. As
a solution, one court suggested that the scope of the "search must be
limited as much as is reasonably practicable by the object of the
search."133  Officers should first narrow their search to certain
"sub-containers" of data.134 While trying to balance the need for law
enforcement agents to access some-but not all-data available on a
cell phone, this holding fails to provide any guidance for officers as to
precisely which sub-containers they may search.135 It is nonetheless
illustrative of how difficult it is to craft limits on the virtual scope of a
search incident to arrest while maintaining a bright-line rule to
promote the effective application by law enforcement officials.
C. Exigent Circumstances as Justification for a Warrantless Cell Phone
Search
In addition to a search incident to arrest, exigent
circumstances is another exception to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement.136 Such circumstances exist when there is an
imminent threat of the destruction of evidence.13 7 The exception
requires the reasonable belief by a law enforcement officer that
evidence is in imminent danger of being removed or destroyed.13 8 This
differs substantially from a search incident to arrest, where the
131. See, e.g., Newhard v. Borders, 649 F. Supp. 2d 440, 444, 449 (W.I). Va. 2009)
(dismissing claim under section 1823 for constitutional rights violation because officers viewing
sexually compromising pictures of arrestee and girlfriend on arrestee's cell phone in a search
incident to arrest for suspicion of DUI was not a violation of Fourth Amendment rights).
132. See supra Part II.A.
133. Hawkins v. State, 704 S.E.2d 886, 892 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
134. Id.
135. See id. (holding that a search of photos or audio files when looking for a text
message would not be appropriate but not articulating a clear test to determine the scope of an
appropriate search).
136. Warrantless Searches and Seizures, supra note 17, at 68-69.
137. Id. Though other exigent circumstances exist-such as "hot pursuit," the risk of a
suspect fleeing, or the safety of law enforcement officials-the imminent destruction of evidence
is the only exigent circumstance that is pertinent to the warrantless search of cell phones. See id.
138. Id. at 69.
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preservation of evidence serves as a justification for the exception, but
not a requirement to search.139
Many courts have reasoned that a search of a cell phone or
personal electronic device incident to arrest is lawful because it is a
situation where an officer needs to preserve evidence from
destruction.140 The search-incident-to-arrest doctrine, however, does
not require an actual showing of exigent circumstances-for instance,
the imminent destruction of evidence-so long as the search is within
the scope of the doctrine.141 In effect, the fact that some courts have
relied on the imminent need to preserve evidence to rationalize a
search incident to arrest indicates that cell phones may not fit cleanly
within the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine. Rather than justifying a
search incident to arrest, situations concerning the imminent
destruction of evidence fall more appropriately under the exigent
circumstances warrant exception, which several courts have used to
permit the warrantless search of a cell phone's contents.142
In cell phone searches, exigent circumstances may arise when
there is a fear that incoming calls or messages will replace recent calls
or messages in a phone's memory,143 or that an arrestee's accomplice
will activate a remote wipe program to erase the phone's memory
entirely.14 4  Rapid improvements in technology, however, have
obviated the former of these two concerns.145 Modern cell phones no
139. Id. at 60, 70, 71.
140. See, e.g., United States v. Parada, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1303-04 (D. Kan. 2003)
(upholding the search of a cell phone because incoming calls would delete entries listed in a call
log, thereby destroying evidence).
141. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
142. See, e.g., United States v. Zamora, No. 1:05 CR 250 WSD, 2006 WL 418390, at *4-5
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2006) (concluding that the "legitimate concerns" of losing the data from the
cell phones created "exigent circumstances [that] authorized the seizure of the cell phones and
the search of their electronic contents"); Parada, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 1303 ("Because a cell phone
has a limited memory to store numbers, the agent recorded the numbers in the event that
subsequent incoming calls effected the deletion or overwriting of the earlier stored numbers.").
143. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 278 F. App'x 242 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding that
officers have no way of knowing if text messages would be deleted, giving rise to a "manifest
need . . . to preserve evidence"); United States v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR, 2008 WL 5381412, at
*3-4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2008) (suppressing cell phone evidence in part because the government
failed to establish that text messages at issue would have been destroyed absent agent's
intervention).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Gomez, No. 1:10-CR-103-2-CAP, 2010 WL
5524891, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 15, 2010) (finding officer's testimony to provide sufficient evidence
that cell phone's contents could be remotely deleted, "thus implicating the need to preserve
evidence").
145. See United States v. Gomez, where the court stated:
We tend to agree with this position and recognize the ever-weakening argument that
a modern cell phone, with its continually advancing technology, is at any risk of
deleting its call history or text messages folder to make space for incoming calls or
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longer store only a handful of recent text messages and phone calls
and greatly expanded digital memories eradicate any real risk of
automatic deletion.146 Thus, the exigent circumstance justification
predicated on this pager-era rationale of lost data is no longer valid."
Remote wipe programs, on the other hand, pose a real and
substantial risk of destroying evidence. Such programs, designed to
protect user data on lost cell phones, allow an individual or third party
to erase the memory of a cell phone from a remote location.148
However, for an arrestee to effectively erase evidence requires the
presence of a number of factors: (1) a phone must be enabled with
remote wipe capabilities, (2) an accomplice must have access to the
remote wipe program, and (3) there must exist some way for the
arrestee to contemporaneously alert the accomplice of the arrest.149
Given these coordination difficulties, one court suggested that law
enforcement officials need probable cause of a remote wipe threat in
order to implicate the exigent circumstances exception.15 0
Irrespective of the possibility of a remote wipe, law
enforcement officers have several simple ways to prevent a loss of cell
phone data. The officer may disconnect the wireless access of the
phone, remove the phone's battery, depower the phone, or place the
phone in a container shielded from wireless signals.15 1 For example,
recent innovations, such as Faraday bags, allow officers to place the
text messages-the memory capacity of a cell phone is far, far greater than that of an
analogized two-decade older pager.
807 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1150 n.17 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
146. See id.
147. See id. ("Indeed, pagers pre-dated commercial [I]nternet usage; modern cell phones
however are fully [I]nternet capable. The weakness of this analogy is glaringly obvious.").
148. See, e.g., Doug Aamoth, App of the Week: Find My iPhone, TECHLAND (Nov. 23,
2010), http://techland.time.com/2010/11/23/app-of-the-week-find-my-iphone (noting that iPhone
users can see their lost "iPhone on a map and can remotely lock it, delete all the data, or send a
message to the screen asking for it to be returned").
149. See Find My iPhone, APPLE, http://www.apple.comliphonelbuilt-in-apps/find-my-
iphone.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2012) (noting that a remote wipe of an iPhone requires the use
of either iCloud or another Apple product, access to that software, and implementation of a
remote wipe sequence).
150. As the district court in Gomez stated:
[T]he agents never proffered evidence to support an objective belief that the cell
phone's call log history was ever at risk of being lost or destroyed. In fact, while
agents testified to their speculation that a cell phone could theoretically be 'wiped'
remotely by an unknown third party, each agent testified that they had no reason to
believe that Defendant's specific cell phone was capable of remote deletion.
807 F. Supp. 2d at 1150 n.17. But see United States v. Salgado, No. 1:09-CR-454-CAP, 2010 WL
3062440, at *3-4 (N.D. Ga. June 12, 2010) (finding that exigent circumstances exist when there
is a possibility that the data can be compromised through a remote wipe).
151. See People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 515 n.24 (Cal. 2011) (noting that officers may
prevent the risk of remote wipe by simply taking out the phone's battery or placing it in a
shielded container), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 (2011).
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phone in a small container to shield wireless communication without
eliminating the officer's access to it.152 Taking any of these simple
precautionary steps would prevent an accomplice from remotely
accessing a phone.153 An officer may perform these operations more
quickly than conducting a full search of the phone's data, thereby
reducing the window of opportunity for a third party to initiate a
remote wipe sequence. The result is that preventive measures to
thwart a remote wipe may actually be more effective at preserving
evidence than an immediate warrantless search.
At best, exigent circumstances are a tenuous justification for
the warrantless search of a cell phone's contents. Though a real
threat in the past, the potential for evidence destruction as a result of
incoming messages or calls is now virtually nonexistent.154 While
remote wipe programs still pose a threat to the destruction of
evidence, there is an extremely low probability that an arrestee has
both the capability and coordination to effectively erase a phone's data
at the time of the arrest.
D. Suggested Solutions from Courts and Commentators
Courts have been reluctant to explore creative solutions to the
inherent Fourth Amendment issues in a search of a cell phone's
contents incident to arrest, opting instead to either entirely permit or
suppress evidence obtained from a phone's memory. Commentators,
on the other hand, have offered a number of solutions drawing lines
somewhere between the polar judicial approaches.155
Professor Adam Gershowitz considers a series of solutions that
courts could adopt. First, he offers the bright-line position of
prohibiting all searches of cell phone contents incident to arrest.156
Alternatively, he suggests four options: (1) encourage legislative
bodies to adopt a more protective rule,1 7 (2) adopt an open-application
152. Mark Sutton, Faraday Bags Help Secure Seized Mobile Devices, ITP.NET (Aug. 26,
2011), http://www.itp.net/585942-faraday-bags-help-secure-seized-mobilc-devices.
153. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 515 n.24.
154. See, e.g., David Kravets, Which Telecoms Store Your Data the Longest? Secret Memo
Tells All, WIRED (Sept. 28, 2011, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/09/cellular-
customer-data.
155. See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA
L. REV. 27, 45-57 (2008).
156. Id. at 45-47.
157. Id. at 50.
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test,158 (3) adopt a five-steps-of-searches test,'59 or (4) distinguish
between data stored on the device and remotely-stored data.o60
State statutes aimed at reducing the scope of a search incident
to arrest with respect to cell phone contents could swiftly and
effectively reduce the warrantless search abilities of law enforcement
officials. But implementation of such policy faces two fundamental
obstacles. First, legislators are generally inclined to favor broader
police enforcement powers, and thus they are reluctant to take
positions that appear criminal-friendly.161 Second, as Gershowitz
acknowledges, "it is unlikely that a lobby will form to press for a law
exempting iPhones from the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine."162
While circumstances may arise to overcome these obstacles,'6' courts
should not wait for legislative action. A search incident to arrest is
fundamentally a privacy issue, not a policy issue. Thus, the
appropriate forum to address a breach of Fourth Amendment rights is
in the courts, not in the legislature. Any limitations on the doctrine
from the judiciary would not preclude further policy-based limitations
by rule-making bodies.
In an "open-application test," police could search the contents
of any application that is open on the phone at the time of the seizure,
but could not open any others.164 Though Gershowitz offers several
critiques of this approach,165 the most compelling critique is
absent-the open application could likely be one containing expansive
quantities of highly private information. Consider an open email
application, which would allow an officer to search the entirety of the
arrestee's inbox. Likewise, an application enabling access to a home
158. Id. at 53.
159. Id. at 54.
160. Id. at 56.
161. See Jonathan Simon, Megan's Law: Crime and Democracy in Late Modern America,
25 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 1111, 1111-12 (2000) ('The centrality of crime to electoral politics and
the formal actions of state and federal politicians has long since become conventional wisdom.");
Eli Lehrer, Op-Ed., It's Hard to Be Soft on Crime, NAT'L REV. (Dec. 14, 2009),
http://www.national review.com/corner/191574/its-hard-be-soft-crime/eli-lehrer ("[P]oliticians
across the political spectrum just want to be seen as 'tough on crime' and are unwilling to bend
at all even when they know that other policies might be better for the public.").
162. See Gershowitz, supra note 155, at 53.
163. Gershowitz suggests that it is highly likely that legislators or their immediate
family could own smart phones, and that concerns about exposure of financial crimes could
prompt them to action. Id. Likewise, he suggests that a prominent executive or connected
individual could be caught in a scandal involving a search incident to arrest of his cell phone,
and as a result lead a lobby against the practice. Id.
164. See id.
165. See id. (noting that it would be difficult to gauge the honesty of law enforcement
officials and that it does not prevent the destruction of evidence because an arrestee could delete
messages and then close the application).
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computer would permit an officer to view all of the contents of the
arrestee's personal files. Medical- or financial-record apps would be
equally intrusive. This approach fails to provide a definitive limit to
the scope of a search incident to arrest.
Permitting officers to carry out a five-step search-essentially
allowing officers to make five inputs or clicks on the phone166-could
similarly reveal highly personal information about an individual.
There are also evidentiary problems inherent in determining the
number of steps that an officer took, and as Gershowitz indicates, the
choice of five steps is entirely arbitrary.167 The arbitrary selection of
permissible steps would result in an uneven application of the rule,
allowing different levels of access on different devices. In some cases
it could reveal personal information, and in others it could prohibit an
officer from accessing a call log. Selecting the appropriate level of
steps is "beyond the institutional capacity of courts."168
Gershowitz's final suggestion-distinguishing between data
stored on the device and remotely stored data169-has both privacy
and application concerns. While limiting the scope of a search to data
stored on the device reduces privacy concerns, this solution fails to
address the ever-expanding storage capacity of the phones themselves.
For example, the sixty-four gigabyte iPhone has over sixteen hundred
times the capacity of the average personal computer manufactured in
1990.170 A significant privacy concern is the protection of data on the
phone. The test is likewise problematic in that it requires officers to
distinguish information that is remote from that which is local-a
virtually impossible task and highly prone to error. Furthermore,
phone developers seek to seamlessly integrate remote data into the
phone's functionality, enhancing the difficulty of discerning which
data is permissible to search. With thousands of cell phone models, it
is not the type of bright-line rule needed for Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.
Another suggested approach is to distinguish between smart
phones and conventional cell phones.171 Professor Matthew Orso
proposed that for conventional, older-generation cell phones, officers
could search coding but not content-based information.172  Coding
166. Id. at 54.
167. Id. at 55.
168. Id. at 55-56.
169. Id. at 56.
170. See Amazing Facts and Figures About the Evolution of Hard Disk Drives, ROYAL
PINGDOM (Feb. 18, 2010), http://royal.pingdom.com/2010/02/18/amazing-facts-and-figures-about-
the-evolution-of-hard-disk-drives.
171. Orso, supra note 77, at 221.
172. Id. at 212-13.
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information is information that identifies the parties to a
communication, such as phone numbers, email addresses, or pager
numbers.173  Content-based information is the "substance of a
communication" or private information stored for personal use,
including "text messages, emails, voicemails, digital photographs, and
other data."1 74
The coding-content distinction creates a clear line of
demarcation in the virtual scope of a search, and does so in a manner
that seems to accurately reflect the point at which an individual's
expectation of privacy increases. But Orso indicates that a
coding-content distinction is not workable for smart phones.75 For
example, it may be difficult for a law enforcement official to see the
sender of a text message or email without inadvertently viewing some
of the content, such as the title or body of the message.76 This would
create difficult fact-finding inquiries in suppression cases and prevent
desirable bright-line rules.77
Instead, Orso argues that because of its likeness to a computer,
a search of a smart phone incident to arrest should require a
warrant.178  He suggests that courts should distinguish between
coding and content-based information to address privacy concerns for
conventional cell phones, while requiring a keyboard-touchpad
examination in order for officers to quickly determine if a device is a
smart phone.'79
In Smith, both the majority and the dissent rejected this
approach for two reasons.'so First, the rule is unworkable because it
would assign officers the difficult task of distinguishing the
capabilities of a cell phone prior to each search and then correctly
categorizing it as a smart phone or conventional cell phone.18 Second,
a conventional cell phone is not an object limited in functionality to
the placing of calls.82 Rather, even conventional cell phones can
connect to the Internet, transfer data, send text messages, take
pictures, and more.183
173. Id. at 187-88.
174. Id. at 188.
175. Id. at 222.
176. See id. at 212; cf. id. at 222.
177. Id. at 222.
178. Id. at 221-22.
179. Id.
180. State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954-55 (Ohio 2009); id. at 957 (Cupp, J., dissenting)
("It would be unworkable to devise a rule that required police to determine the particular cell
phone's storage capacity.").
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Distinguishing a smart phone from a conventional phone by
examining whether the phone has a touch screen or a full keyboard
seems to be a clean distinction and easy for law enforcement officers to
apply. Generally speaking, smart phones have these features and
conventional phones do not. But phone designers are now
implementing touch screens and full keyboards into conventional cell
phones. Orso notes that as this trend grows, "more devices would be
protected against warrantless searches incident to arrest."18 4 It is not
unlikely that progress will incorporate these features into all phones,
which would effectively create a rule prohibiting the search of any
phone incident to a lawful arrest. Such a rule, however, is contrary to
Orso's own conclusion, and that of this Note.185 A complete restriction
on cell phone searches incident to arrest is not an appropriate
solution, "because the custodial arrest context does justify a
'reasonable intrusion' into an arrestee's belongings."186
Applying a different rule for conventional cell phones and
smart phones, no matter the manner of the delineation, may have
Equal Protection implications. Smart phones tend to be a more
expensive product than conventional cell phones and require costly
monthly data plans.187 The result of a more expensive product is that
smart phone owners are likely to be wealthier than owners of
conventional cell phones.188 As such, wealthier individuals who can
afford a smart phone would be entitled to more privacy than those
who could only afford a conventional cell phone. Hypothetically, in
two identical arrests, law enforcement officials could conduct a more
intrusive search on a conventional-phone owner than on a
smart-phone owner, even though both owners carry the same
searchable information. Analysis of whether this implicates a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause is an analysis outside the
scope of this Note; however, courts should consider the policy rationale
resulting from this distinction.
184. Id. at 222-23.
185. Id. at 212.
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Roger Cheng, AT&T Hikes Data Prices, Caps for Smartphones, CNET
NEWS (Jan. 18, 2012, 2:06 PM), http:/Inews.cnet.coml8301-1035_3-57361397-94 (noting that
AT&T smartphone data plans range from twenty to fifty dollars per month).
188. Josh Wolford, Nielsen: Smartphones Are for the Young, Wealthy, WEBPRONEWS
(Feb. 20, 2012), http://www.webpronews.com/nielsen-smartphones-young-wealthy-2012-02
(noting that Nielsen study indicates that smartphone purchasers are either young or wealthy, or
both).
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III. USING THE TRADITIONAL FUNCTION OF A CELL PHONE TO DRAW A
BRIGHT LINE FOR THE SCOPE OF CELL PHONE SEARCHES INCIDENT TO
ARREST
This Note proposes that the appropriate test for the scope of a
cell phone search incident to arrest should concern the function of a
cell phone. Such a search should be limited to the traditional
functions of a cell phone-namely, phone calls and text messages.
Under this rule, a law enforcement officer would be allowed to search
an arrestee's call log (the record of phone calls), text messages (the
record and content of text message communications), and address
book (the universe of recipients to whom the owner can call or text),
but nothing more. Other functions, such as email, Internet access,
mass data storage, photographs, and other software apps are more
akin to functions traditionally associated with a computer. When a
mobile device incorporates those same computer-like functions, it does
not follow that an owner abandons the high expectation of privacy
associated with those functions.
A rule predicated on the particular cell phone function has
several advantages. The rule is applicable to all cell phones
irrespective of their technology and is simple for law enforcement
officials to implement. It also addresses an arrestee's heightened
privacy concerns and is consistent with much of the early
jurisprudence for cell phone searches relying on the container
doctrine.
This rule would be simple for law enforcement officials to
apply. First, they would not have to distinguish between smart
phones and conventional phones, as the rule would apply equally to
both. Second, the call log, text message, and address book features
operate independently of the proscribed computer-like functionality,
such as email. Thus, officers can access these functions on a cell
phone without navigating through proscribed features.
Finally, adopting a function-based rule would allow many
courts to maintain precedent with respect to the search of a cell phone
incident to arrest. The test implicitly acknowledges two types of
devices: devices with a finite capacity to hold information and devices
with immeasurable storage capacities. The former devices should be
subject to the container doctrine, while the virtual scope of the latter
devices takes them outside the scope of that doctrine. When a device,
such as a smart phone, contains the features of both, it is necessary to
determine which functions have an unlimited virtual scope, because
the virtual scope creates a heightened expectation of privacy. Because
traditional phone functions such as call logs, text messages, and
address books have a limited virtual scope, they are associated with
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devices that fit within the parameters of the container doctrine, such
as a physical address book or a purse.
This function-based rule is consistent with legal precedent;
courts have typically validated a cell phone search incident to arrest
when the case concerned traditional cell phone functions. Therefore,
adopting the rule would not require courts to assert that previous
decisions were overly broad or wrongly decided. Rather, a container
capable of holding a call history, text message history, and an address
book falls within the scope of the container doctrine and does not
violate the Fourth Amendment. Where cell phone funtionality
appears more like that of a computer, courts should find that the
information contained therein falls outside the scope of the container
doctrine, thereby preserving heightened expectations of privacy in
that information.
The features that fall within the realm of traditional phone
functionality, while limited, are not arbitrary. Each feature either
raises minimal privacy concerns or has strong analogical ties to
accepted container doctrine jurisprudence. For example, courts widely
consider call logs, unlike other cell phone features, to have little or no
expectation of privacy. An address book on a cell phone is nearly
identical to a handwritten address book, which courts have previously
deemed within the scope of the container doctrine.189
Text messages are the most controversial feature in a
function-based rule. But there are strong justifications supporting
their inclusion in a search-incident-to-arrest rule. First, text
messages are very similar to pager messages, which courts have long
upheld as searchable without raising many privacy concerns.190 While
not perfect, the similarities between a pager message and a text
message, as opposed to a pager message and an email, are apparent.
Second, courts have doubted whether there is a reasonable expectation
of privacy in text messages under the third-party doctrine.191 Unlike a
phone conversation, wireless phone companies maintain records of the
189. See United States v. Lynch, 908 F. Supp. 284, 288 (D.V.I. 1995) ("Just as police can
lawfully search the contents of an arrestee's wallet or address book incident to an arrest, we hold
that the agents here could lawfully search the contents of Thomas' pager incident to his arrest.");
United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 534 (N.D. Cal. 1993) ("The expectation of privacy in an
electronic repository for personal data is therefore analogous to that in a personal address book
or other repository for such information.").
. 190. See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, No. 96-4259, 1998 WL 887289 (4th Cir. Oct. 29,
1998); United States v. Charles, 138 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977
(7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v.
Galante, No. 94 Cr. 633 (LMM), 1995 WL 507249 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1995); Chan, 830 F. Supp. at
531.
191. See, e.g., United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 959 (6th Cir. 1990).
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contents of text messages.192 Additionally, the message sender does
not know if an unknown third party is in possession of the receiving
device. Third, the weight of jurisprudence overwhelmingly supports
inclusion of text messages.193
IV. NARROWLY LIMITING THE EXIGENT-CIRCUMSTANCES
JUSTIFICATION FOR CELL PHONE SEARCHES
Because of the increased privacy concerns in cell phone
content, judicial rules should not permit officers to merely circumvent
a limited search-incident-to-arrest doctrine through a broadly applied
exigency justification. As previously noted, the exigency exception to
the warrant requirement necessitates an imminent threat to the
destruction of evidence.194 In cell phones, this means the loss of data
as a result of subsequent calls or text messages, or the destruction of
data by a third party through a remote wipe program.
Technological innovations have made the first concern moot, as
modern mobile devices have large storage capacities that do not delete
recent communication history.19 5 While the threat of a third party
erasing the cell phone's data always exists so long as the phone can
connect to the Internet, the coordination problems in alerting a third
party to the arrest and providing instructions to erase the phone's
contents greatly reduce the threat of a remote wipe.196 Thus, the
exigency exception should apply only when a law enforcement officer
demonstrates that he had probable cause to believe that a third party
had been contacted or was prepared to delete the phone's data.197
The exigency exception is otherwise inapplicable. An officer
with unsubstantiated concerns of a remote wipe has myriad ways of
protecting the phone's contents.1 98 The officer can disconnect the
phone from the Internet, power the phone off, remove the battery, or
place the phone in a transmission-resistant container, such as a
Faraday bag.199  Such bags have the ability to block mobile
192. See Cell Phone Location Tracking Request Response-Cell Phone Company Data
Retention Chart, ACLU (Aug. 2010), http://www.aclu.org/cell-phone-location-tracking-request-
response-cell-phone-company-data-retention-chart.
193. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 278 F. App'x 242, 245-46 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding
that officers permissibly accessed and copied text messages in a search incident to arrest);
United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that officers could search a
cell phone's call records and text messages incident to arrest).
194. Warrantless Searches and Seizures, supra note 17, at 70.
195. See United States v. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1151 n.17 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
196. See supra Part II.C.
197. See Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1151 n.17.
198. See supra Part II.C.
199. See Sutton, supra note 152.
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transmissions while maintaining the officer's ability to access the
phone, and they are not cumbersome for an officer to have on his
person or in his patrol vehicle.200 The ample means to preserve the
phone's contents and the low probability of remote wipe actually
occurring mitigate any imminent threat of the destruction of evidence.
By narrowly limiting the exigency exception for law
enforcement officials, a search incident to arrest would be confined to
the function-based test. This test permits police to view traditional
cell phone functions, including call history, text messages, and address
books. But the rule prohibits officers from viewing any other function
of the cell phone, most of which have an unlimited virtual scope and
an increased expectation of privacy. The result is a bright-line rule
that officers can apply in the field, that takes into consideration the
search-incident-to-arrest rationale and precedent, and that also
protects the arrestee's heightened expectations of privacy in cell phone
data.
V. CONCLUSION
The ubiquity of cell phones and similar wireless devices in
society creates many challenges for our legal system. Fundamentally,
it requires that the system adapt legal principles to changing norms.
With the advent of cell phones and smart phones, individuals have
access to a wealth of information in the palm of their hand; however,
these devices are also portals to their most personal information.
The Supreme Court created the container doctrine with the
purpose of establishing a bright-line rule that permitted an invasion of
privacy but limited the encroachment o the physical scope of what an
individual could carry. Smart phones effectively remove this basic
constraint; digital access to information has become virtually limitless
and can be carried in nothing larger than a pocket. Courts must
therefore adjust the legal principles of a search incident to arrest to
account for the increased expectation of privacy in wirelessly
accessible personal information.
Where an absolute prohibition on evidence obtained from a cell
phone is contrary to the principles of the search-incident-to-arrest
doctrine, unlimited access to that information intrudes upon Fourth
Amendment privacy rights. Thus, the balance must be somewhere in
between. A function-based test, applying the standard of the
container doctrine to the traditional functions of a cell phone, strikes
that balance. It provides an easily applied, bright-line rule for law
enforcement officials. And it protects privacy expectations by creating
200. Id.
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definitive boundaries in the virtual scope of a cell phone search. At
the same time, this rule does not require a majority of courts to
reverse prior decisions regarding the permissible scope of a cell phone
search, but instead only narrowly limits those holdings. Only through
enunciating a firm line between privacy expectations and the
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine can courts protect the guaranteed
rights of the Fourth Amendment.
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